We put forward a new approach to mechanism design, and exemplify it via a new mechanism guaranteeing significant revenue in unrestricted combinatorial auctions. Our mechanism
form of mechanism design, solely lies with the players themselves. The desired property, however, typically depends on the players' types. (E.g., in an auction of a single good, a traditionally desired property consists of allocating the good to the player who values it the most.) Thus a designer strives to find a mechanism "enticing" rational players, that is players acting so as to maximize their utilities (expected utilities, in case of probabilistic mechanisms), to de facto "work for him." That is, he wants to design a mechanism M such that, for all appropriate contexts C, the desired property is guaranteed to hold in a rational play of (C, M ). Traditionally this means that the property should hold "at equilibrium."
Equilibria. An equilibrium is a strategy profile σ such that every player i is better off sticking to his strategy σi if he believes that all other players stick to theirs. That is, denoting by −i the set of all players but i, a strategy profile σ is an equilibrium if, for all players i and all alternative strategies σ i , ui(M (σi σ−i)) ≥ ui(M (σ i σ−i)).
Thus the meaningfulness of an equilibrium crucially depends on the players' (correct) beliefs. A stronger notion, solely depending on the players' rationality (rather than their beliefs), is that of a dominant-strategy equilibrium. This is a strategy profile σ * such that, for every player i, any alternative strategy σ i for i, and any strategy subprofile σ−i for the other players: ui(M (σ * i σ−i)) ≥ ui(M (σ i σ−i)). Thus, in a game with a dominant-strategy equilibrium σ * , the best option for any player i is to choose strategy σ * i , no matter what the other players might do.
Traditional Desired Properties. In a combinatorial auction, two quantities are crucial in an outcome Ω = (A, P ): the social welfare of Ω, sw(Ω), defined as i T Vi(Ai), and the revenue of Ω, rev(Ω), defined as i Pi.
Accordingly, one traditionally tries to design combinatorialauction mechanisms M such that the social welfare and/or the revenue of M (σ) are high either for some equilibrium σ, or for all equilibria σ. Both social welfare and revenue are "in expectation" if M is probabilistic.
DST Mechanisms and the VCG.
A normal-form mechanism is said to be dominant-strategy truthful (DST for short) if, for every player i, announcing his own true type is a dominant strategy. In combinatorial auctions, the famous VCG mechanism [18, 4, 9] is DST and maximizes social welfare.
On input a profile of valuations V , the VCG returns (a) the allocation A maximizing, over all possible allocations A , i Vi(A i ); and (b) the price profile P , where each Pi equals the maximum, over all possible allocations A , of j∈−i Vj(A j ) minus j∈−i Vj(Aj).
The Case for Resilient Mechanism Design
A manuscript of Micali and Valiant still unpublished, and therefore referred to as "MV" herein, highlights two main weaknesses of traditional mechanism design, and advocates overcoming them by designing mechanisms in a specific resilient way. Let us explain.
Weaknesses of Traditional Mechanisms.
By aiming to achieve a desired property P "at equilibrium," traditional mechanism design suffers from two main problems:
1. Equilibrium Selection and 2. Collusion.
The problem of equilibrium selection arises with the existence of multiple "reasonable" equilibria. Indeed, even if M guarantees that P holds at each possible equilibrium of the game (C, M ), if some players believe that the equilibrium ultimately played out is σ while others believe that it is τ , then the profile of strategies actually selected will be a mixture of σ and τ rather than an equilibrium, and P may not hold.
Equilibrium selection is not a problem when P holds at a dominant-strategy equilibrium σ. In this case, in fact, whether or not other equilibria exist, one can confidently predict σ to be the one actually played out by rational players. But then, collusion continues to be a problem, because it prevents traditional mechanisms from guaranteeing their desired property P. Indeed equilibria (even dominant-strategy ones) are very fragile notions: they only imply that no single player has any incentive to individually deviate from his envisaged strategy, but two or more players may have all the incentive in the world to jointly deviate from their equilibrium strategies. If they do so, the property P that was guaranteed at equilibrium, may not hold at all.
The problem of collusion is not only theoretical, but very practical as well. Collusion in auctions is both well documented, and very disruptive. In particular, as insightfully shown by Ausubel and Milgrom [1] , the VCG mechanism, despite being DST, is totally vulnerable to collusion: even two (sufficiently informed) players may totally destroy its social welfare. To justify some of the choices of our paper, it is important to recall their counter-example in its simplest form:
Consider a combinatorial auction with two goods, g1 and g2, three players, 1, 2, and 3, and the following true valuations: T V1({g1}) = T V2({g2}) = 1, T V3({g1, g2}) = 100 and T Vj(S) = 0 in all other cases. For this context, the allocation giving both goods to player 3 has a social welfare of 100, and is indeed the "best possible." Because the VCG is DST, if all players were independent, then the best strategy for them is to bid their true valuations, so that the VCG allocates both goods to 3 for a price of 2 (the other players pay 0). However, assume that players 1 and 2 collude, and that they know that player 3 values only the two goods together and for at most v (as of today, v = 10 20 should be pretty safe). Then the colluding players are better off bidding the valuations T V 1 and T V 2 , where T V i ({gi}) = v and T V i (S) = 0 in all other cases. Because player 3, being independent, will continue to bid his true valuation T V3, the VCG, on input T V 1 , T V 2 and T V3, will allocate g1 to player 1 for a price of 0, and g2 to player 2 for a price of 0 (the price of player 3 will also be 0). Thus, the total social welfare will be 2, rather than 100 (and the total revenue will be 0). This is so despite the fact that the VCG is a DST mechanism maximizing social welfare.
The Ausubel-Milgrom example highlights that, although the "best form" of equilibrium, a dominant-strategy equilibrium still is an equilibrium, and thus offers no guarantee against collusion. Their same example also highlights that the VCG mechanism has no guarantee about revenue, even in absence of any collusion. Indeed if T V 1 , T V 2 and T V3 respectively were the true valuations of the three players, the VCG would return 0 revenue, despite "strong competition for the goods."
MV Resiliency.
MV proposes two principles to address the above weaknesses:
1 Dominant-Strategy Truthfulness and 2 Collusion Neutralization. Obviously, a DST mechanism dispels any problem of equilibrium selection. Let us thus focus on explaining the second principle. Collusion neutralization aims at guaranteeing the same performance as when, by magic, all collusive players disappeared, leaving the mechanism to be run with just the independent players. Ideally, of course, a designer would prefer to be able to "extract additional performance" from the collusive players, but in light of the Ausubel-Milgrom example (where just two colluders can ruin any performance whatsoever), neutralizing collusive players is an attractive goal. According to MV's second principle, the designer of a mechanism has no responsibility if all players are collusive, but is fully responsible for satisfying the desired property so long as a single independent player exists. We stress that, when neutralizing collusive players, not only the designer does not know which players are collusive, but neither do the independent players. Yet, the designer should guarantee the performance of his mechanism solely by providing a proper incentive structure.
Although the notion of MV resiliency applies to all kinds of desiderata and contexts, we shall focus on generating revenue in unrestricted combinatorial auctions.
Ultimately, in combinatorial auctions, the performance of any mechanism can be measured via a benchmark, a function B mapping any valuation profile V to a real number. To capture collusion neutralization, B should not be applied to the entire valuation profile V , but just to the valuation subprofile of the independent players, denoted by VI .
Accordingly we say that a mechanism M achieves MVresiliently a fraction c of a revenue benchmark B if 1 M is DST and 2 For any true-valuation profile T V , any set of independent players I and any bid subprofile V−I , the revenue M generates for the profile of bids T VI V−I is at least c · B(T VI ). Of course such resiliency is interesting only if B and c are both reasonable; and of course, "the higher the fraction c, the better the mechanism."
Revenue Limitations of MV Resiliency.
Although achievable, MV's notion of resiliency has severe limitations visà vis revenue. Denote by MSW− the benchmark consisting of the maximum social welfare after removing the "star" player (that is the one valuing some subset of the goods more than anyone values any subset) 1 . Then, disregarding small constants, MV proves the following results about guaranteeing revenue in unrestricted combinatorial auctions:
• There exists a probabilistic mechanism that MV-resiliently achieves a logarithmic (in the minimum of n and m) fraction of MSW− ; and
• No mechanism MV-resiliently achieves more than that.
Since resiliency looks attractive, but logarithmic fractions do not, we shall build resilient mechanisms of a new type. Let us emphasize that MV's revenue upperbound is very meaningful, because it holds for all possible probabilistic DST mechanisms, not just for those of a special form (such as mixtures of deterministic mechanisms). Accordingly, there are no more general forms of probabilistic DST mechanisms to explore: we should instead explore new approaches to resilient mechanism design.
SUMMARY OF OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
DST mechanisms may very well be the best way to avoid equilibrium-selection problems. But if we also want to avoid MV's revenue upperbound we must choose at least one of the following two alternatives: A1. Assuming that more knowledge is available (e.g., that the seller has some Bayesian information about the players' true valuations) or A2. Adopting a solution concept weaker than dominantstrategy equilibrium.
Actually, in this paper we take both alternatives, but without violating the purest form of mechanism design (i.e., "all knowledge resides with the players") and without introducing any equilibrium-selection problem. In other words, we want to satisfy the spirit of resilient mechanism design, but free it from the specific technical interpretation given by MV. In this paper, focussing on revenue, we retain MV's notion of collusion neutralization, but otherwise provide new conceptual frameworks and mechanisms.
A New and General Collusive Model.
We envisage a very adversarial collusion model for the players. (Recall that in an auction the seller is not a player, and thus we do not envisage player-seller collusion.) In particular, we allow for any number of collusive players, partitioned into any numbers of collusive sets. We do not restrict the cardinality of collusive sets, nor the way in which the members of a collusive set coordinate their actions. If they so want, the members of a collusive set may enter binding agreements on how to act.
We insist, however, that all players be rational, else prediction of players' behavior and mechanism design itself would be severely impaired. An independent player, that is a player i not belonging to any collusive set, is individually rational and acts so as to maximize his traditional utility function ui from outcomes to real numbers. A collusive set C is collectively rational, that is its members coordinate their actions so as to maximize their own collective utility function uC , mapping any outcome to a real number.
To maximize meaningfulness, we want the relationship between uC and the individual utility functions of C's members to be as general as possible, provided that we do not "transform collusive players into irrational ones." (Indeed, what is the difference between a set C of crazy players and a set C of players rationally maximizing a crazy uC ?
2 ) Accordingly, we demand that uC be minimally monotone. Let us explain. Consider two outcomes that are absolutely identical, as far as C's members are concerned, except for member i who receives no goods and pays P i (may be negative) in the first outcome, but receives a subset of goods Ai and pays Pi in the second. Then, minimal monotonicity requires that C prefers the first outcome if −P i > T Vi(Ai) − Pi, and the second if −P i < T Vi(Ai) − Pi.
3
Minimal monotonicity is of course a restriction on uC , but: (a) it is the only restriction to our otherwise general collusion model; and (b) it is a very reasonable restriction.
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A New Knowledge-Based Benchmark.
Traditional mechanism design works by leveraging the knowledge that each player has about himself, but a different and potentially enormous source of knowledge exists: the knowledge that the players have about each other. Focussing on auctions, each player i not only has internal knowledge, that is knowledge of his own true valuation T Vi, but also some external knowledge, that is some information about T V−i, the other players' true valuations. (This is without any loss of generality, since the external knowledge of i may be "empty.") We prove that even this external knowledge alone is successfully exploitable, even when the designer has no information whatsoever about the players.
5 Indeed: A main feature of our approach is to benchmark a mechanism's performance against the players' external knowledge.
The external knowledge relevant to our mechanism is "how well each independent player i could sell the goods" if he were the seller, via take-it-or-leave-it offers to the other players. (That is, i's relevant external knowledge is the maximum revenue that i knows he can guarantee via an outcome in which only the players in −i receive goods, everyone only pays if he receives some goods, and no one pays more than his true value for the received goods.) Accordingly, initially assuming that the seller is totally ignorant, Our revenue benchmark is the revenue "known" to the best informed independent player.
Players (e.g., in spectrum auctions) may have quite accurate information about their competitors' valuations, yet this source of knowledge was under-utilized in auction design. Aiming at collusion neutralization, we focus on the knowledge of independent players, and we guarantee nothing when they have no "external knowledge." (But, in separate papers, we obtain meaningful results in this setting too.) 3 For example, a minimally monotone uC may consist of the sum of the individual utilities of C's members. As for a more eccentric example, uC may be the sum of: the individual utility of C's first member, half of the individual utility of C's second member, a third of the individual utility of C's third member, and so on. 4 In a sense, since each of them receives exactly the same goods for exactly the same price, the other members of C -if consulted when choosing uC -should have no reason to object against i's receiving goods that he values more than his price relative to the case when he receives nothing. Indeed, they may even demand (additional) side-payments from a happier i! 5 Of course, auction mechanisms are easier to come by if the designer has suitable information about the players' true valuations. But acquiring this information may be too hard. In particular, for auctions of a single good, Cremer and McLean [5] have fully captured the information structure needed to generate the maximum possible revenue, but concluded that acquiring this information would be too difficult for their result to be of practical use.
A New Solution Concept.
Although not DST, the mechanism put forward in this paper is immune to any equilibrium-selection problem. The reason is very simple: it relies on an equilibrium-less solution concept. At a very high level, it guarantees its goals as long as each player selects a strategy surviving iterated elimination of "essentially strictly dominated strategies."
This elimination and our solution concept are somewhat complex because our mechanism is of extensive-form, and is run in a collusive setting where the players may have little or no information about who colludes with whom, or the collective utility functions of the collusive sets (if any).
After this iterative elimination process is completed, each player is left with a plurality of surviving strategies, and ultimately he chooses one of them to play. Accordingly, it is quite possible that the strategy profile actually played is not an equilibrium at all, yet the mechanism's goals are achieved just the same: any profile of "not-dumb" strategies will do. Therefore, what we call implementation in surviving strategies solely relies on common knowledge of rationality, and not on the players' beliefs. In such an implementation it is hard to predict precisely which profile of strategies will be ultimately played. But while "strategy predictability" has always been the cornerstone of traditional mechanism design, it has always been a mean to an end, not the end itself. Ultimately, in an auction we do not care about predicting strategies, but care a lot about predicting revenue (or social welfare).
A New Mechanism.
We exhibit a new mechanism M for unrestricted combinatorial auctions. Whenever the players select strategies surviving iterated elimination of dominated strategies, M guarantees, in our general collusion model and without any information about the players, revenue equal to a half of the revenue known to the best informed independent player (minus an arbitrarily small ). Importantly, M is computationally efficient, makes the use of approximation algorithms compatible with players' incentives, and preserves the players' privacy to an unusual extent.
PRIOR WORK
Protecting auctions against collusion has so far envisaged either restricted types of collusion or restricted types of auctions. Notably, group strategy-proof mechanisms [13, 17, 6] are robust only against collusive players unable to make sidepayments to each other. On the other hand, c-truthful mechanisms [7] withstand a general behavior of collusive players, but are restricted to offer any subset of goods S to any player i for a fixed price pS,i, and thus cannot produce high revenue unless sufficient information about the players' true valuations is known in advance to the designer. Alternative forms of such mechanisms are free to choose more general outcomes (so as to approximate maximum revenue), but satisfy a weaker notion of collusion resilience and apply to restricted auctions: namely, single good in unlimited supply. Resilient mechanisms also exist for a variety of other restricted auctions, in particular those of [14, 2, 3, 10, 15, 8] . By contrast, we do not impose any such restrictions.
Finally, all the above mechanisms are based on dominantstrategy equilibria. A solution concept closer to ours is the classical one of implementation in undominated strategies. In essence, in our language, a mechanism M achieves a property P in undominated strategies if P holds for any outcome obtained by running M on a profile of undominated strategies. (See Jackson [12] for a formal version.) This notion, however, was never exemplified in any setting of incomplete information, let alone in auctions. Babaioff, Lavi and Pavlov [2] both proposed a feasible variant of this notion (in essence, each player can compute his undominated strategies efficiently) and provided the first (and efficient too) mechanism satisfying it for a restricted type of combinatorial auctions. Namely, their mechanisms applies to auctions in which each player i has only two possible values for any subset of the goods: either 0 or a fixed value vi. In sum, the solution concept of [2] requires less rationality than ours, but their mechanism does not address collusion at all, and does not apply to unrestricted combinatorial auctions.
GENERALIZED CONTEXTS/AUCTIONS
A traditional context for a combinatorial auction can be fully specified by the true-valuation profile T V alone. A generalized auction context is instead fully described by the tuple (T V, (C, I), u, RKI , GKI ), where: T V continues to be the true-valuation profile, again an original and fundamental object; (C, I) describes the collusion structure, that is the sets of collusive players and the set of independent players; u describes the generalized utilities, that is the utility of each agent, that is collusive set or independent player, for each possible outcome; RKI describes the relevant knowledge, that is the part of the independent players' knowledge exploited by the mechanism; and GKI describes the general knowledge, that is all the information available to and exploitable by the independent players. Let us now explain.
Collusion Structure
In our auctions we envision arbitrarily many collusive sets. Our only restriction is their disjointness. Else, saying that a collusive set acts rationally becomes more problematic. Definition 1. (Collusion Structure.) A collusion structure consists of a pair (C, I), where C is a partition of the players, and I is the set of all players i such that {i} ∈ C.
We refer to a player in I as independent, to a player not in I as collusive, to any C ∈ C of cardinality > 1 as a collusive set. We use the term agent to denote either an independent player or a collusive set. Since each player i, collusive or not, belongs to a single set in C, for uniformity of presentation we may denote by Ci the set to which i belongs. (A collusion structure specifies separately the set I for convenience and clarity only.)
Generalized Utilities
Definition 2. (Generalized Utility Function.) We say that u is a generalized utility function, for a set of players with true-valuation profile T V and collusion structure (C, I), if u is a vector, indexed by the subsets in C, of functions from outcomes to real numbers satisfying the following two properties 1. For all C ∈ C and all outcomes (A, P ) and (A , P ) such that (AC , PC ) = (A C , P C ): uC (A, P ) = uC (A , P ). 2. For all i ∈ I: u {i} (A, P ) = T Vi(Ai) − Pi.
We refer to uC as C's collective utility function. If i ∈ I, we more simply write ui rather than u {i} . Definition 3. (Minimally Monotone Utilities.) Let u be a generalized utility function for a collusion structure (C, I). We say that u is minimally monotone if, ∀C ∈ C, ∀j ∈ C, and ∀ outcomes (A, P ) and (A , P ) such that (A C\{i} , P C\{i} ) = (A C\{j} , P C\{j} ) and A i = ∅, we have: uC (A, P ) ≥ uC (A , P ) if and only if T Vi(Ai) − Pi ≥ −P i .
Our Relevant Knowledge and Benchmark
Definition 4. (External and Relevant Knowledge.) Let i be an independent player in a combinatorial auction setting with true-valuation profile T V and collusion structure (C, I). Then, i's external knowledge, denoted by EKi, is the set of all outcomes (A, P ) satisfying three properties: 1. External Sale Only. Ai = ∅ and Pi = 0.
No Donation.
Pj is a positive integer whenever Aj = ∅.
3. Known Feasibility. Pj = 0 if Aj = ∅; else, it is known to i that Pj < T Vj(Aj). The relevant knowledge of i, denoted by RKi, is defined to be the outcome in EKi having maximum revenue; that is,
Notice that any outcome Ω in EKi is a way for i to "offer the goods to the other players." Indeed, property 1 guarantees that Ω offers non-empty subsets of the goods only to players other than i. Moreover, property 3 guarantees to i that, so long as the generalized utility function is minimally monotone, each offer in Ω will be (rationally) accepted. Thus, Ω essentially is a guaranteed way for i to generate revenue rev(Ω) by selling the goods to the other players, no matter what the minimally monotone generalized utility function u may be. Property 2 is a technical requirement with two purposes. The fact that "Pj is positive" is used in our mechanism. (Our mechanism incentivizes players to get some goods for free by providing their relevant knowledge to the seller, and property 2 prevents them from getting goods for free by relying on other players.) The fact that "Pj is an integer" ensures that RKi is well defined. (If EKi had infinite cardinality, the outcome with the maximum revenue may not exist.) Of course, if breaking ties proves necessary, RKi is chosen to be the lexicographically first outcome with maximum revenue.
Definition 5. (The MEW Benchmark.) In a generalized context with independent player set I, the best informed player in I, bip(I), is so defined:
And the maximum external welfare benchmark is so defined:
Notice that the known-feasibility property of RKi guarantees that our benchmark consists of "true knowledge." (In future papers we shall also consider benchmarks based on players' beliefs rather than true knowledge.)
General Knowledge
Definition 6. In a combinatorial auction setting with true-valuation profile T V , collusion structure (C, I), and generalized, minimally monotone utility function u, the general knowledge of an independent player i, denoted by GKi, consists of (T Vi, the fact that i ∈ I, and) all the information about T V−i, (C, I), and u−i, known to i.
Of course, GKi and RKi must be compatible with each other. In a sense, RKi should be properly deduced from GKi. Let us consider two examples.
1. GKi consists of a subset of V−i (the set of all possible valuation subprofiles for the players in −i) such that T V−i ∈ GKi. That is, GKi is the set of all possible candidates, in i's opinion, for the other players' true valuations. Such GKi is genuine in the sense that one of its candidates is the "right one." 6 In this example, RKi is deduced from GKi in two conceptual steps. First, for each valuation subprofile V ∈ GKi, one computes EK 2. GKi consists of a "partial" probability distribution over V−i. 
Why also considering GKi if our mechanism uses RKi?
The reason is: meaningfulness. Indeed, after a mechanism is chosen, the players will rationally act relying on all the knowledge available to them, not just the one that the mechanism relies upon. And by relying on their general knowledge, they may act quite differently than the "mechanism wants." Accordingly, to enhance the meaningfulness of our results, we do not restrict the players' general knowledge at all. That is, Our mechanism achieves our relevant-knowledge benchmark for all possible (but compatible!) general knowledge of the independent players. We are fully aware, of course, that better performance could be guaranteed by assuming some suitable restriction for the players' general knowledge. And some of these restrictions may be very realistic and profitable in some future contexts.
In Sum
Definition 7. We say that a generalized auction context C = (T V, (C, I), u, RKI , GKI ) is minimally monotone if u is minimally monotone and this fact is common knowledge.
We say that (C , M ) is a (minimally monotone) generalized auction if M is a mechanism, and C a (minimally monotone) generalized context.
If C is a minimally monotone generalized context whose components have not been explicitly specified, then by default we assume that
Remarks.
Although deducible from the subprofile GKI , RKI is explicitly part of the generalized context for clarity.
In this paper, an independent player i's relevant knowledge is non-Bayesian, even when his general knowledge is Bayesian: that is, RKi always is a way known i to sell the goods to the other players that succeeds with probability 1, whenever the other players are rational. When player i's relevant knowledge is a probability distribution over V−i more care is needed (the subject of a separate paper).
A generalized context does not define the knowledge of collusive players for two reasons. First, even if each player had his own general knowledge, the "general knowledge of a collusive set C may be hard to predict." (In principle there is no way to guarantee that C's members truthfully reveal their general knowledge to each other. For instance, if C arose from an initial negotiation, then a member i of C might have had incentives to lie about his knowledge in order to enter C and/or influence in his favor the choice of uC .
8 ) Second, we do not need any assumption on the collusive players' general knowledge to achieve our results. The minimal monotonicity of the generalized utility function is all we require.
(Although each GKi has been defined to consist of information about T V−i, (C, I) and u, it might also include information about the other players' knowledge.)
OUR SOLUTION CONCEPT
Implementation in surviving strategies may already be useful in much simpler settings -e.g., settings with complete information and without collusion-and might perhaps benefit from a more gradual presentation. To avoid excessive overlapping, however, we choose to present it directly for the setting at hand: combinatorial auctions with secret valuations and collusive players. We actually focus on a refinement of our solution concept maximizing our mechanism's meaningfulness.
Implementation in
In practice, there seem to be different levels of rationality. That is, many players are capable of completing the first few iterations of elimination of dominated strategies, but fail to go "all the way." Accordingly, one should prefer mechanisms that guarantee the desired properties for any vector of strategies surviving just the first few iterations. Our mechanism achieves our benchmark for any vector of strategies surviving the following two-round elimination process. First, each agent removes all its dominated strategies. Then, each independent player further removes all strategies which now become dominated. Since it is common to refer to the set of strategy profiles surviving the first iteration as Σ 1 , and to that surviving the first two iterations as Σ 2 , we call this refinement of our solution concept implementation in Σ 1 /Σ 
Formalization.
We define implementation in Σ 1 /Σ 2 I strategies in a way that is more general than needed. (Indeed, our mechanism allows for a more demanding and compelling notion.) Since in this paper collusion is deemed illegal, but should be neutralized, it suffices to consider mechanisms specifying only the strategies of individual players. Accordingly, denoting the set of all deterministic strategies of a player i by Σ 0 i , the set of all deterministic strategy profiles by Σ 0 , the set of all deterministic collective strategies of a collusive set C by Σ •
Note that each Σ 1 A,C is uniquely defined up to "renaming/removing" equivalent strategies. 9 Indeed, for all C we have Σ
are distributions over outcomes, and the inequality means that the two distributions are different.
• is compatible with a collusive set C if C ∈ C C and u C C is C's collective utility function.
Note that, fixing the mechanism M , we have (1) Σ 1 A,C is the same for any C compatible with A. In fact, the set Σ 0 C (= Σ 0 ) is fully determined from M alone, and which strategies of A are undominated over Σ 0 solely depends on A's utility function (rather than, say, on the partition of the other players into collusive sets, and their utility functions). Accordingly, we shall more simply write Σ 
C is crucially dependent on C . In fact, although the set of undominated strategies of each agent is "independent of the overall collusive context", a set of players C may be an agent in a collusive context C , but not in another context C . (For instance, C may consist only of independent players in C . In this case, let 10 be the number of players in C. Then, in C , Σ • We denote by Σ 2 i the set of strategies in Σ 1 i which are not globally dominated.
• We say that a strategy vector σ is a
Strategies.) Let P be a property of auction outcomes, and M an auction mechanism. We say that M implements P in Σ 1 /Σ 2 I strategies if, for all generalized contexts C , and all
plays σ of the auction (C , M ), P holds for M (σ).
Remarks.
Note that Σ 2 i has been obtained by eliminating Σ 1 i strategies that are distinguishably dominated in a very strong sense. A player having more information about the real context might be able to eliminate more strategies, and thus further refine Σ 2 i . If M is probabilistic, then M (σ) is a distribution over outcomes, and P a property of outcome distributions.
OUR MECHANISM
Although requiring some modifications, the basic idea behind our mechanism is very simple: each player i, simultaneously with the others, announces an outcome Ω i = (α i , π i ) satisfying properties 1, 2, and 3 of Definition 1, except that we do not require that π i j < T Vj(α i j ) whenever α i j = ∅. Let be the "star player", that is the one who has announced the outcome with the highest revenue. Then, we try to sell the goods according to Ω , so as to generate revenue R = rev(Ω ). That is, we ask each player i ∈ − , receiving some goods in α , whether he is willing to buy the subset of goods α i for price π i . If i agrees, the subsale is final. Else, the star player pays a fine equal to π i and the goods in α i remain unallocated.
Note that the star player may not be the best informed independent player, but our benchmark is achieved if each independent player i does not "underbid", that is, if he announces an outcome whose revenue is at least as high as that of RKi. Thus: can we ensure that an independent player i does not underbid? The problem is that, depending on the generalized context, underbidding may be the best thing to do. For instance the context may be such that (1) player i is the best informed player; (2) the second best informed player is j; and yet (3) player j is badly informed about player i: that is, RKj allocates to i a subset of goods Si that i highly values for a ridiculously low price. In this case, i would be better off if j announced RKj and were the star player. In sum, underbidding may be far from being a dominated strategy.
To guarantee that rational independent players do not underbid, we adopt a two-pronged strategy.
First, our mechanism modifies the above basic procedure as follows. Together with RKi, each player i also announces his (suppositively) favorite subset of the goods, Si. If i is declared the star player, then a coin toss of the mechanism determines whether the above basic procedure takes place or i receives Si for free, and all other goods remain unallocated.
Second, the mechanism gives back to the players some amount of revenue: in particular, a fixed small amount, 0 < < 1. Each player i actually gets a fraction of proportional to the revenue of his announced Ω i . (Formally, this enables us to avoid any ambiguity about relying on "weakly dominated strategies" in our solution concept.)
A precise analysis proves that, for all independent players, underbidding does not survive the iterated elimination of distinguishably dominated strategies. The same cannot be said about collusive players, but then we do not rely on them for revenue. However, we must ensure that they do not hurt the achievement of our benchmark.
(In M's description below, real actions occur in "numbered steps" and public updates in "bulleted steps.") Mechanism M
• Set Ai = ∅ and Pi = 0 for each player i. • Set: Ri = rev(Ω i ) for each player i and = argmax i Ri. (We shall refer to player as the "star player.") 2. Publicly flip a fair coin.
• (If Heads:) reset A := S and HALT. • Reset:
(1) for each player i announcing NO, P := P + π i ;
(2) for each player i announcing YES, Ai := α i and Pi := π i ; and
ANALYSIS OF OUR MECHANISM M
Our mechanism M and its analysis assume that a player's true valuation maps subsets of the goods to non-negative numbers (but we could handle negative valuations as well).
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In the analysis below, all individual strategies, collective strategies, and vectors of strategies are relative to M.
Three Lemmas.
Our result follows from the three intuitive but technical lemmas below, proved in a fuller version of this paper available at http://people.csail.mit.edu/silvio/Selected Scientific Papers/Mechanism Design. Lemma 3. ∀ independent player i and ∀ σi ∈ Σ 2 i , rev(Ω i ) ≥ rev(RKi) (that is, i does not "underbid").
Notice that, while ruling out underbidding (relative to RKi) for independent players, our lemmas say nothing about the possibility of "over-bidding." In fact, not only over-bidding needs not be distinguishably dominated, but even be the rational thing to do for some independent players -it all depends on their general knowledge.
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Fortunately, our main theorem guarantees that we achieve our revenue benchmark whether or not over-bidding is dominated for all independent players. 11 In traditional auctions, valuations are bids, and the seller would immediately dismiss bids associating a subset S of the goods to a negative number (since he has no intention to assign S to a player and also pay him to accept S). The "bidding process" of our mechanism however asks each player i to announce in Step 1 a subset Si of the goods without mentioning any value for Si. In principle, therefore, i may have a negative valuation for Si. And leaving things as they stand, i may have (subtle) reasons to announce such an Si. 12 For example, assume that the relevant knowledge RKi of an independent player i specifies allocating to a player j a subset of the goods S for a price pj. However, i' general knowledge GKi may include some Bayesian information according to which the probability that T Vj(S) > 100pj is extraordinarily high, although not equal to 1. In such a case, to maximize his chance of becoming the star player, i may be better off risking a possible answer NO from j and announce an outcome Ω i allocating S to j for a price 100pj.
Main Theorem.
Theorem 1. For all minimally monotone generalized contexts C and all Σ 1 /Σ 2 I plays σ of (C , M), we have
Proof. By Definition 2, bip(I) is the independent player "realizing" our benchmark: that is,
Notice that players bip(I) and may not coincide, and that the following two inequalities hold in any
Indeed, Inequality (a) holds because player bip(I) is independent and, by Lemma 3, he does not underbid; and Inequality (b) holds by Inequality (a) and the fact that R ≥ rev(Ω bip(I) ) by the definition of . Notice that M generates revenue only when its coin toss comes up Tails, and when this happens, the revenue generated coincides with R , because for each player i such that π i > 0, the seller receives π i , from i if i announces YES, and from if i announces NO. Therefore for any σ ∈ Σ 1 /Σ 2 I , the following equality holds for M's expected revenue:
because the total "rebate" given to all players in the last step is < . Inequalities (b) and (c) imply our thesis.
Q.E.D.
ADDITIONAL PROPERTIES OF M
Privacy and Deniability/"Tax Freeness".
Although traditionally irrelevant to mechanism design, the privacy that a mechanism provides to its players is important.
Consider a second-price auction of a single good where the highest true valuation for the good is $10M, and the second highest is $1M. Since the second-price mechanism is DST, we expect the players to bid their true valuations, so that the winner bids $10M and pays $1M. Assume, however, that the auction takes place in a country with an overreaching and tyrannical tax code, where the Internal Revenue Service is allowed to collect taxes on "auction utilities." (After all, even lottery gains are taxable in many countries!) In such a country, our winner would own taxes over $9M. Indeed, unless he pleads "temporary insanity", acting rationally in a DST mechanism, he himself has freely admitted to a utility of $9M. In such a country, therefore, it is not clear whether the players will bid truthfully in the secondprice mechanism. Consider now selling the same good, to the same players and in the same country, via an ascending English auction. In such an auction truthful bidding is not endangered by the tax code: the players who "drop out" reveal their true valuations but are not "taxable" because they have no utility, while the winner never reveals his true valuation, so that he could always credibly deny to value the good for more than what he pays. Beyond tax advantages, players value their privacy, and the fact that ascending English auctions preserve the privacy of the winner perhaps provides an additional explanation of why they are more used than the second-price auctions.
Our mechanism provides even more deniability/"tax advantages" than ascending English auctions, even when it deals with multiple goods for sale. A player receiving some goods never declares how much he values them. If M's coin ends up Heads, then the star player receives for free his favorite subset S, but never says anything himself about his own valuation for S. (Whatever the other players say about him could be just "hearsay," and over-bidding is not dominated for them.) If M's coin ends up Tails, then every player who answers YES receives goods that he may always claim to value for exactly what he was offered to pay and indeed paid. In addition our mechanism preserves, to a very large extent, also the privacy of the players who do not receive any goods at all. (And with proper use of envelopes, our mechanism would reveal even less information, without having to trust the auctioneer.)
In sum, loss of privacy may alter the way games are played, and mechanisms should be designed so as to preserve as much privacy as possible. In particular we believe that being "tax-free" is a crucial property of an auction mechanism.
(A general result of Izmalkov, Lepinski, and Micali [11] guarantees that every normal-form mechanism has an extensiveform version that perfectly implements it, in particular without any privacy loss. Note, however, that their construction -although feasible-is practically inconvenient. By contrast, our mechanism M offers a lot of privacy "for free!" 13 )
Computational Efficiency.
Although traditionally neglected in mechanism design, the computational efficiency of a mechanism is important too.
Unlike the VCG, that requires solving NP-hard problems, our mechanism M is computationally trivial. Indeed, after each player i reports his Ω i , M needs only to sum up the prices in each Ω i and figure out the outcome with the largest and second-largest revenues.
One might object, however, that M transfers all hard computations to the players themselves. Not quite so, because:
1. Computing the relevant knowledge might be easy: it all depends on the form of general knowledge. (In the extreme, if RKi coincides with GKi, there is nothing for player i to compute.) 2. Each player i can always use an efficient algorithm to approximate RKi without altering any incentives. Let M be a DST auction mechanism whose outcome function f , as for the VCG, is very hard to compute. Then, the auctioneer could not use any feasible approximation f of f , because the so modified mechanism M may no longer be DST! By contrast, in our M, it is in each independent player i's best interest to report his best possible approximation to RKi known to him. (Because reporting an outcome known to i to be feasible dominates reporting any outcome with a lower revenue.) Thus, while for the VCG approximation distorts incentives, for our M approximation is aligned with incentives. Putting it differently, assume that RKi is really hard to deduce from GKi, and that an auction using mechanism M is announced in two weeks time. Then, after computing day and night for two weeks, each independent player i can only report an approximation to his true RKi. Yet, M still achieves our benchmarks, not defined on the perfect relevant knowledge, but on the relevant knowledge actually known to the players at the time of the auction.
VARIANTS AND EXTENSIONS
Our mechanism relies on rewarding the players by giving them back a fixed and small "rebate" . Keeping on the spirit of M there are several alternatives for rewarding the players. In particular, one may consider rewards as percentages of the revenue collected. As for another alternative, one may consider rewarding the star player, when the coin toss ends up Tails, with the difference between R and the "secondhighest revenue." (Of course these alternatives reduce our revenue benchmark. However the "sum of social welfare and revenue" will not be affected.)
So far, we have assumed that the seller/designer knows nothing about the players. But it is easy to accommodate a designer having some knowledge about the players. For instance, this knowledge may -in keeping with our overall approach-be modeled as an outcome Ω which he knows to be "realizable." In particular, if R is smaller than rev(Ω), then the mechanism tries to sell the goods according to Ω.
Our approach yields significantly better results for simpler auctions, in particular auctions of multiple copies of a single good. Here, in a forthcoming paper, not only we show that it is possible to achieve higher knowledge-benchmarks, but also that it is possible to aggregate the knowledge of all players into a greater total collective knowledge. In particular, in the case of a single copy of a single good, we can guarantee revenue that is at least equal to that of the second-price mechanism and possible significantly higher if the players are well informed about each other.
Beyond auctions, our approach also applies to other aspects of mechanism design, in particular to provision of a public good, for which all prior mechanisms were highly vulnerable to collusion, and in a way much more overt than in the VCG case.
In this paper we benchmark against the "guaranteed" knowledge that the players have. In a forthcoming paper with Avinatan Hassidim we shall prove that stronger results are possible in a more conservative Bayesian setting, that is, assuming that the players (rather than the designer!) know the distribution from which their true valuations are drawn. This is more in line with the true spirit of mechanism design, where all knowledge lies with the players.
In this paper we show that it is possible to leverage the external knowledge of the independent players. In a most recent result with Paul Valiant, we shall prove that, even in unrestricted combinatorial auctions, it is possible to leverage both the internal and external knowledge of all players, including the collusive ones. (By a player's internal knowledge we mean his own true valuation.) The result assumes a slightly weaker collusion model and solution concept.
